Engage America's Friends on Afghanistan
The Obama administration needs to retool its strategy, and fast.
G. PARTHASARATHY / June 16, 2010

As General Stanley McChrystal prepares his offensive to end Taliban control of southern Afghanistan, America's friends from Saudi Arabia to India are looking on nervously, apprehensive of whether the Obama administration will stay the course. This isn't an idle fear; it is a concern borne of the White House's lack of communication with friends and allies on its strategy in Afghanistan, and a distressing record of inconsistent policy messages. Matthew Kaminski of the WSJ Editorial Board on the challenges we face in Afghanistan and Kyrgyzstan.

The United States has pursued contradictory tacks on Afghanistan for months, starting with its treatment of President Hamid Karzai. Just prior to President Obama's visit to Kabul on March 28, National Security Adviser General James Jones, Ambassador to Afghanistan General Karl Eikenberry and several unnamed officials quoted in major newspapers described President Karzai as corrupt and inept. But the administration suddenly changed its tune when Mr. Karzai hit back and refused to back proposed military operations in Kandahar. By the time the Afghan leader arrived in Washington in May, the Obama administration had flip-flopped again: General McChrystal appears to have persuaded the White House that American operations against the Taliban would flounder without President Karzai's support.

American allies are also concerned at what is seen as excessive optimism that the Pentagon can persuade the Pakistani military to end its support for the Taliban in Afghanistan. As Harvard's Matt Waldman notes, Pakistan's intelliegence service "orchestrates, sustains and shapes" the Taliban's campaign in Afghanistan, provides "sanctuary and substantial financial and logistical support" and exercises almost decisive control over the leadership. Yet Islamabad has not received a public rebuke from Washington for these activities, which clearly undermine U.S. efforts across the border.

The problem is so bad that normally quiescent allies are voicing their concerns. Prince Turki al Faisal, who as the Head of Saudi Arabia's Intelligence Services had tried and failed to persuade the Taliban to mend its ways, surprised an audience in Riyadh last month by characterizing U.S. policies in Afghanistan as "inept," averring: "The way this [U.S.] administration has dealt with President Hamid Karzai beggars disbelief and amazement." The influential Saudi royal, a long-time supporter of close relations with Washington, advised the U.S. to "hunt down the terrorists on both sides of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, arrest them or kill them, and get out, and let the Afghan people deal with their problems." Privately, analysts and officials I've spoken with in the U.S., India and Europe agree.

If no action is taken, the problem will only get worse. Pakistan's military establishment already appears to have concluded that given American dependence on Pakistan for its supply routes to Afghanistan, the Pentagon has no choice but to acquiesce to Islamabad's support of the Taliban. NATO allies are weary of the fight and many desire to exit Afghanistan at the earliest possible opportunity. The U.S. public, too, is starting to wonder why the country should lose blood and treasure in a far-off country, in a war that now ranks as America's longest-running conflict. The Obama administration, therefore, needs to comprehensively review its "Afpak" policies if it is to avoid getting bogged down in this country that is its main focus in the war on terror.

The first step is to find ways to immediately reduce the role Pakistan plays in the country. Some 60% of supplies for Afghanistan comprising fuel, food and some equipment are presently routed through Pakistan, with around another 30% coming by train through Russia and Afghanistan's neighboring Central Asian Republics. A wider U.S.-Russian strategic dialogue could seek to increase American supplies for its forces in Afghanistan via Russia and Central Asia, thus reducing the strategic salience of the supply routes through Pakistan.

The next step should be a longer-term initiative to help Afghanistan establish, as former U.N. official C.R. Gharekhan and former U.S. diplomat Karl Inderfurth proposed recently, "more reliable relations with its neighbors and near neighbors, including Pakistan, Iran, China, India and Russia." This diplomatic initiative could be spearheaded by the U.S., but bring together Afghanistan's neighbors and regional powers—including Saudi Arabia—to create a regional consensus on measures that need to be taken to ensure that Afghanistan is insulated from interference in its internal affairs, while ensuring that its territory is not used to undermine the security of its neighbors.

Then finally, the U.S. military should focus on establishing basic security in Afghanistan's major centers of commerce and trade and stopping cross-border insurgents from entering the country via Pakistan. The latter may not be popular in Islamabad, but it's essential to stopping the flow of militants and achieving the former goal.

There are no easy solutions to stabilizing Afghanistan, but one thing's for sure: The U.S. can do a better job by consulting its friends and allies more closely.

Mr. Parthasarathy, a visiting professor at the Center for Policy Research in New Delhi, was India's ambassador to Pakistan from 1998 to 2000.