Defensive diplomacy won't work
The Hindu
G. Parthasarathy / December 23, 2010
The cables raise doubts as to whether New Delhi has consistent policies in dealing with Pakistan.
The WikiLeaks cable exchanges between Washington and Islamabad are particularly useful to India. It is now clear that, faced with the challenge of terrorism unleashed by the Pakistan Army, the Obama administration has obvious limitations in extending support to India.
The revelations will, hopefully, introduce a measure of long overdue realism in those who advocate that mere sweet words can convince the hard-boiled Generals in Rawalpindi to shed their compulsive hostility towards India.
But the cables give rise to serious doubts and misgivings about whether New Delhi has any consistent policies in dealing with its Western neighbour. They also raise doubts about the viability and consistency of internal decision-making in the portals of power in South Block.
LETTING OFF PAKISTAN
When the then US National Security Adviser Gen.James Jones, called on the Defence Minister, Mr A. K. Anthony, on June 28, 2009, and raised the issue of dialogue with Pakistan, Mr Anthony responded: “Unless there is some tangible follow-up action by Pakistan against the perpetrators of the 26/11 attack, discussions with Pakistan will be difficult”.
The US NSA promised to take this up with the Pakistanis, while adding there was “need to move forward on a broader strategy of building confidence and trust”.
Barely a fortnight later, on July 16, the Prime Minister, Dr Manmohan Singh, strangely agreed that “action against terrorism should not be linked to the composite dialogue process and these should not be bracketed”. What prompted this inexplicable U-turn in policy within a fortnight?
No one argues that we should shun dialogue with Pakistan. But, at the same time, agreeing to unconditionally resume the “composite dialogue process” without Pakistan fulfilling its assurances on ending terrorism against India undermines our position on the centrality of Pakistani-sponsored terrorism.
Baluchistan issue
The Baluchistan issue is another instance of India's defensiveness. The Sharm el-Sheikh Declaration strangely noted that “Prime Minister Gilani mentioned that Pakistan has some information about threats in Baluchistan and other areas”.
Yet, according to the WikiLeaks documents, the Afghanistan President, Mr Hamid Karzai, categorically rejected Pakistani allegations of Indian involvement in Baluchistan, adding: “Pakistan will continue to think India is involved. There is lot of misinformation out there.” If Mr Karzai could be so forthright on Baluchistan why has India been so defensive in responding to Pakistani accusations?
AFPAK POLICY
India can look back with satisfaction on the firmness it has shown in dealing with developments in Afghanistan.
On the eve of assuming office, the Obama Administration was excessively influenced by the arguments of Pakistani academics such as Ahmed Rashid that it should appoint a special envoy to resolve differences between India and Pakistan, on Jammu and Kashmir. New Delhi reacted decisively, by debunking such talk and thereafter by refusing visits to India by the late Richard Holbrooke, during the course of his frequent visits to Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Holbrooke was forced to publicly clarify that his charter of responsibilities did not include India and his visits to New Delhi were primarily for exchanging views on AfPak developments. In his meeting with General Jones last year, Mr Antony made it clear that India wanted the international community's operations in Afghanistan to succeed, adding: “India cannot, for a moment, imagine a Taliban takeover of its extended neighbourhood.” With the NATO now clarifying that it intends to continue combat operations in Afghanistan till the end of 2014, there is a wider consensus in the US about the inadvisability of leaving a power vacuum in Afghanistan, which would lead to a Taliban takeover.
AGAINST US WITHDRAWAL
A recent report of the Centre for New American Security, prepared by the former ISAF Commander in Afghanistan, General David Bruno, recognises that “the war in Afghanistan is unlikely to have a well-defined end with clear winners and losers”.
It calls for a restructuring of governance in Afghanistan with more power devolved to provinces and districts. Moreover, it advocates a “responsible transition”, which allows the US to “focus its resources in countering transnational terrorist groups based in the Pakistan-Afghanistan Region”.
Writing in the “Foreign Affairs” Quarterly, former Ambassador to India, Robert Blackwill, advocates that the US should stop talking of an “exit strategy” and adopt a long-term strategy of counter-terrorism in Pashtun-dominated Southern Afghanistan.
The US should accept that the Taliban will inevitably control most of Southern and Eastern Afghanistan, while taking on “nation building” with support from Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras and “supportive Pashtuns”, in northern and western Afghanistan.
He adds that in such a scenario the US should continue to provide arms and intelligence to those Pashtun tribal leaders ready to challenge Taliban hegemony.
Acknowledging that his strategy could result in a de facto partition of Afghanistan, Blackwill advocates the reduction of troop levels in Afghanistan to between 35,000 and 50,000 troops. He argues that “such a strategy would reduce Islamabad's capacity to use the US ground role in Southern Afghanistan to extract tolerance from Washington regarding terrorism emanating from Pakistan”.
Both these recent studies by prominent American analysts reject any possibility of rapid American withdrawal from Afghanistan, as such withdrawal would “trigger a global outpouring of support for jihadist ideology and increased terrorism against liberal societies more broadly”.
India will have to focus its diplomatic efforts on securing international support for strategies that enable Afghans to run their country overcoming the pernicious ambitions of neighbouring Pakistan.
The agenda and timing of dialogue with Pakistan would have to be determined by hard-headed considerations of Indian national interests and not by what the Americans “advise” us to do.
