US at crossroads in Afghanistan
The Tribube
G. Parthasarathy / August 19, 2010

America’s “Special Representative” for the AfPak region, Mr Richard Holbrooke, recently described Pakistan Army Chief General Ashfaque Parvez Kayani as an “enormously powerful political factor in the country,” adding that in keeping with his American training traditions, the good General was “smart” and a “remarkable strategic thinker”. This is not surprising, as in American eyes, the ambitious Pakistani Generals who have led their country to disaster in the past — ranging from Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan and Zia-ul-Haq to Pervez Musharraf and Ashfaque Kayani — have all been regarded, till their stars started to decline, as “smart” and “strategic thinkers”.

Every US luminary visiting Pakistan, ranging from Mrs Hillary Clinton and Senator Johan Kerry to Admiral Mullen and Richard Holbrooke, invariably pays homage to General Kayani in Rawalpindi while ignoring his constitutional boss, Defence Minister Ahmed Mukhtar. It was National Security Adviser General Jim Jones alone who observed constitutional and democratic propriety by ensuring that General Kayani was present when he called on the Head of State, President Asif Ali Zardari.

This fascination for “smart” Pakistani Generals has led the US to a situation where its Pakistan Army protégés arm and train jihadis, who kill American nationals in Mumbai and Afghanistan, and then demand an end to any criticism of their support for terrorists. General Kayani has been taped describing Taliban military commander Jalaluddin Haqqani as a “strategic asset.” There is no dearth of evidence, now in the public domain, about how the Pakistan Army arms and trains the Taliban on Pakistani soil to kill Americans, Indians and citizens of US allies and partners in Afghanistan. Why then do American officials mislead their own public about the professed qualities of head and heart of General Kayani? Is it because they are too scared to admit that they have been and are being led up the garden path by yet another “smart” Pakistani General?

A vociferous section of the American public, the media and politicians is now demanding a speedy withdrawal from Afghanistan, amidst rising casualties in America’s longest war on foreign soil. A total of 1221 American soldiers have been killed in operations in Afghanistan since 2001. Casualties have gone up steeply in recent years, from double digits till 2005 to 521 soldiers losing their lives in 2009 and 423 already killed in the first seven months of this year. Costs of the war in Afghanistan are also steadily escalating. The Appropriations Committee of the US Congress approved a supplementary budget of $33 billion for the current financial year for the additional 30,000 US troops recently deployed in Afghanistan. This exceeds the annual budget for India’s entire armed forces! The Americans are now spending an estimated $84 billion annually for their military presence in Afghanistan when their budget deficit is rising.

Apart from US spending in Afghanistan, the American taxpayer has paid $18 billion in military and economic assistance to Pakistan. Military assistance approved for Pakistan thus far amounts to around $13 billion. The bulk of this money has gone towards purchasing Chinese military equipment ranging from fighter aircraft to tanks and frigates, apart from American F16 fighters, air-to-air missiles and naval equipment — all of little use or relevance to fighting the jihadis operating from within Pakistan. The WikiLeaks revelations are only the tip of the iceberg on how Pakistan has milked, misled and double-crossed the Americans, primarily using US naiveté and gullibility to secure military assistance even as the ISI continues to arm, train, equip and harbour Taliban and other terrorists, who regularly kill American soldiers in Afghanistan.

The American strategy of obsequious praise and respect for General Kayani in the hope that he can be sweet-talked into ending support for and taking on jihadi groups, including the Taliban, which have for years been nurtured by the ISI, is destined to fail. A hard-boiled Jhelum-born General Kayani, who comes from the heartland of groups like the Lashkar-e-Toiyaba, is hardly going to let American flattery and solicitude end his support for the assets he has nurtured for years. All this leaves President Obama facing a difficult dilemma.

Growing American casualties in Afghanistan as a result of counter-insurgency operations will cast a shadow on his re-election in 2012. But, being seen to cut losses and run away from Afghanistan, he will invite ridicule, both domestically and internationally. The only wayout, in these circumstances, for President Obama would be to move towards a visible reduction of American forces in Afghanistan, together with moves to reduce casualties by disengaging from active counter-insurgency operations, particularly in Southern Afghanistan, by November 2012. It does, however, appear that the Americans will retain a reduced troop presence and air power in Afghanistan beyond 2012 to back up and train what is presently an ill- equipped, poorly motivated and inadequately trained Afghan National Army.

India has to be prepared for a situation when the ISI-backed Taliban groups will gain increasing control over southern Afghanistan. How will this play out in the rest of Afghanistan, a country where around 56 per cent of the population is made up of non-Pashtuns, who would find any return of the country to Taliban rule totally unacceptable? Under Pakistani pressure, President Karzai recently sacked or sidelined the two most influential non-Pashtun officials in his government — Intelligence Chief Amrullah Saleh and Army Chief General Bismillah Khan. Criticising President Karzai’s efforts for “reconciliation” with the Taliban through the good offices of the ISI, Saleh asserted, “The ISI is part of the landscape of destruction in this country. So, it will be a waste of time to provide evidence of ISI involvement. They are part of it”. More ominously, Saleh alleged that President Karzai was “recklessly” pursuing a compromise and “reconciliation” policy with the Taliban, which he described as “a fatal mistake and a recipe for civil war”.

If the Taliban, with ISI backing, establishes a strong presence in southern Afghanistan, non-Pashtun ethnic groups like the Tajiks, Uzbeks and Shia Hazaras will inevitably seek a loosening of ties with a weakened central authority in Kabul, with a reversion to the situation that prevailed in the mid-1990s. A number of Afghan leaders, including Presidential election candidates Latif Pedram and Abdullah Abdullah and regional leaders like Dostum and Muhaqqiq are now demanding greater regional autonomy.